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fReligious Diversity, Education, and the
"Crisis" inState Neutrality

Benjamin L. Berger*

Abstract
Education-and particularly public education-has become a crucible for the relationship between state and religious diversity, a principal site for contemporary
debates about the meaning of secularism and the management of religious difference.
This is so across a variety of national traditions, and despite wide differences in
the historical and "emotional inheritances" surrounding the configuration of
law, politics, and religion. Through an exploration of Hannah Arendt's thought
about responsibility and freedom in education, this article works towards a better
understanding of why education is such a crucial and fraught field in the modern
encounter between religion and law. The article turns to the recent jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court of Canada to draw out the implications of these ideas, arriving
ultimately at a claim about the nature and limits of the concept of state neutrality.
Keywords: religion, education, Arendt, secularism, law, neutrality, tolerance

RWsum6
IUducation-et tout particuli~rement l'ducation publique-est devenue un creuset
dans la relation entre l'&tat et la diversit6 religieuse, un site principal de d~bats
contemporains h propos du sens de la laicit6 et de la gestion des differences
religieuses. Ceci est le cas h travers plusieurs traditions nationales, malgr6 les
grandes differences qui existent au sein du patrimoine historique et 6motionnel
entourant la configuration du droit, des politiques et de la religion. En examinant
les idles de Hannah Arendt sur la responsabilit6 et la libert6 au sein de l'ducation,
cet article cherche h mieux comprendre pourquoi l'ducation demeure, h l'heure
actuelle, un domaine critique et tendu dans la rencontre entre la religion et le droit.
Cet article se penche sur la jurisprudence r~cente de la Cour supreme du Canada
afin de souligner les r~percussions de ces idles et d'arriver h une conclusion sur la
nature et les limites du concept de la neutralit6 6tatique.
Mots ds:

religion, 6ducation, Arendt, laicit6, droit, neutralit6, tolerance
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The classroom has become a principal site for contemporary debates about the
meaning of secularism and the management of religious difference. This is so
across a variety of national traditions, and despite wide differences in the historical
and "emotional inheritances"' surrounding the configuration of law, politics, and
religion. In Italy, the Lautsi v Italy2 case challenged the historical privilege of
Catholicism in Italy in the context of a modern, bureaucratized European Union
when the practice of hanging crucifixes in all public schools was put in question.
Analogous questions• •3concerning the presence
of religious
symbols in public
4
5
schools have arisen in France, Turkey, and Germany. The case of R(E) v
Governing Body of JFS, 6 in the United Kingdom, raised the limits of religious
community self- definition, asking whether a Jewish school had untrammelled
authority to shape admissions policies that define who is and is not Jewish. Similar
issues concerning the relationship between religious
belonging and legal prohibi7
tions on discrimination have arisen in Israel.
In Canada, the education sphere has become the focal point-often a flashpointfor debates about both the accommodation of religious difference and the challenges
of civic belonging in conditions of religious diversity. This close tethering of issues
of religious difference and education, as well as the use of religion as a site of
accommodation and as a tool for assimilation, has a deep and rich pedigree in
Canada. The political compromises between English and French Canada at the
founding of the nation placed religious accommodation through education at the
cornerstone of the state. The Treaty of Paris(1763) 8 and the Quebec Act (1774) 9
offered to French inhabitants of what would eventually be Canada a form of
accommodation and toleration for Roman Catholicism. These protections found
their expression in the first Canadian constitution, the British North America Act
(1867) ,10 in section 93, a provision that guaranteed publicly funded Roman Catholic
education outside of Quebec, and Protestant public education within majorityCatholic Quebec. Yet alongside this story of accommodation is also a history of

1

The phrase "emotional inheritances" is borrowed from Talal Asad, "French Secularism and the

2

'Islamic Veil Affair;" The HedgehogReview (2006): 93 106.
Lautsi and others v Italy, 19 March 2011, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber),
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No 30814/06.
Talal Asad provides a rich and provocative discussion of the Stasi Commission and its place in
recent debates about French secularism and national identity: "French Secularism and the 'Islamic
Veil Affair;" supra note 1.
See Leila ahin v Turkey, 10 November 2005, European Court ofHuman Rights (Grand Chamber),
No 44774/98.
Tobias Lock offers a helpful account of the recent history of religious symbols in German schools:
Tobias Lock, "Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in German Schools;' in Law,
Relgious Freedoms, and Education in Europe, ed. Marie Hunter Henin (London: Ashgate, 2012),
347 69.
R(E) v GoverningBody of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15.
See, for example, Noar Kehalacha Association v Ministry of Education, (2009) IsrLR 84, HCJ
1067/08; Tebeka Advocacy for Equality & Justicefor Ethiopian Israelis v The Ministry of Education
(2010), HCJ 7426/08.
Definitive Treaty of Peace, France, Great Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763, 42 Cons TS 279.
Quebec Act, 1774 (UK), 14 Geo III, c 83.
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 (formerly
British North America Act, 1867).
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the use of education to control and suppress cultural and religious difference.
Residential schools were used by the state in a devastating assault on Aboriginal
religion, language, and culture, employing state-supported and religiously provided education in an attempt to violently assimilate the Indigenous peoples of
Canada. The effects of this period, one of the darkest in Canadian history, are
still felt today.11 And a journey into the religious history of British Columbia and
Alberta offers up the case of the Doukhobors, whose 1religious
beliefs led to violent
2
clashes with the state over the education of children.
Yet this story of education as the terrain on which issues of religious difference
and civic belonging have been worked out is not simply an interesting, if
harrowing, history. Education has continued to be the arena that has yielded some
of the fiercest and most perplexing challenges in the governance and accommodation of religious difference. Indeed, as the forms and intensity of religious
difference in Canada have multiplied, so too have the cases in which conflicts
between religious accommodation and the demands of public life have taken
shape around questions of education. 13 Shortly after the introduction of the
CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms in 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada
was asked to reconsider the privileging of state-funded Catholic education in
Ontario-the fruit of that guarantee at Confederation found in section 93-in
light of the existence of Jewish, Protestant, and other religious groups for whom
faith- and culture-based education was equally important as a means of sustaining
their communities.15 Although the Supreme Court declined to disrupt the results
of this historical compromise, the issue remains a live political question. The law
of religious freedom led to the secularization of public education, with traditional
Christian symbols and practices draining from public schools. 16 Legal conflicts
between the rights of sexual minorities and those of religious groups have arisen
principally in the field of education, with the Court having to rule on the extent to
which religious viewpoints can inform a public school board's decision making
about representing same-sex parented families in a Kindergarten- Grade 1
curriculum; 1 7 whether publicly funded Catholic schools can exclude a male
student's boyfriend from the prom; 18 and whether a private, Evangelical Christian
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See J. R. Miller, Shingwauk' Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1996). For a recent statement from the Supreme Court of Canada on the effects of
this experience, see R v Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433.
John P. S. McLaren, "The Doukhobor Belief in Individual Faith and Conscience and the Demands
of the Secular State;' in Religious Conscience, the State, and the Law: Historical Contexts and
Contemporary Significance, eds. John McLaren and Harold Coward (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1999), 199.
For an account of some of the features that make religious accommodation and toleration
particularly fraught and vexing in educational contexts, see Colin Macleod, "Toleration, Children
and Education;' EducationalPhilosophy and Theory 42, no. 1 (2010): 9 21.
Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
See Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the EducationAct (Ontario), [1987] 1 SCR 1148; Adler v
Ontario,[1996] 3 SCR 609.
See Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education (1988), 65 OR (2d) 641 (CA).
See Chamberlain v Surrey School DistrictNo 36, [2002] 4 SCR 710.
See Hall v Powers (2002), 213 DLR (4th) 308.
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religious university that has a code of conduct that discriminates against gay, lesbian, and queer students and faculty can have their teacher training program publicly accredited.1 9 Through these and many other cases, both the deeper and the
modern histories of the legal management of religious diversity in Canada could
be told quite ably through a story about education.
This article is an attempt to understand why education, and particularly public
education, has been a crucible for the relationship between state and religious
diversity. I will exploit a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to explore why
this is so and how issues of religious diversity are handled through law. Although
my focus is on the Canadian example, my suspicion is that at least some of its
lessons are generalizable. And ultimately, though I enter the problem through
the portal of education, I arrive at a set of claims about the nature of-and at
a key distinction within-the idea of state neutrality. I begin, however, with one
provocative account of what is at stake in education.
Natality, Responsibility, and the Stakes of Education
In Between Past and Future, Hannah Arendt begins a chapter entitled "The Crisis
in Education" by defending the idea that one could characterize a problem in2
American approaches to education as a "crisis" without engaging in rank hyperbole. 0
Arendt concedes that, in view of the world-scale crises that afflicted humanity in
the twentieth century, complaints about modern approaches to education might
seem of trifling import. Yet she insists on the importance of her topic and the
aptness of her label. The chapter is a kind of account of the grand social and
philosophical stakes of education.
The problem that Arendt identifies is the ascendancy in her time of a view of
child education that embraces a certain constructivist pedagogy, one that insists
that teachers ought not to instruct or teach the children about the world directly
but, rather, that good education inheres in facilitating the child's own discovery of
the world. According to this view, teachers should step back and leave children to
discover and construct the world autonomously. Arendt sees much that is politically
and philosophically wrong in this approach. Indeed, she views it as a crisis of
responsibility. Arendt argues that, through education, adults must take responsibility for the world as it is and faithfully reflect, embody and hold it up to children,
quite apart from their hopes about what that world might become:
[E]ducators here stand in relation to the young as representatives of a world
for which they must assume responsibility although they themselves did not
make it, and even though they may, secretly or openly, wish it were other than
it is. This responsibility is not arbitrarily imposed upon educators; it is implicit
in the fact that the young are introduced by adults into a continuously
changing world. 2'
19

20
21

See Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 SCR 772. See also
Richard Moon, "Sexual Orientation, Equality, and Religious Freedom in the Public Schools: A
Comment on Trinity Western University v. B.C. College of Teachers and Chamberlainv. Surrey School
Board, District36;" Review of ConstitutionalStudies 8, no. 2 (2003): 228.
Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Education;' in Between Pastand Future:Eight Exercises in Political
Thought (London: Penguin Books, [1968] 2006), 170 93.
Ibid. at 186.
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Why, for Arendt, is there this responsibility? Can more be said beyond the banal
observation that what we teach our children is important?
The essence of education, Arendt argues, is the fact of natality: "[T] he fact that
we have all come into the world by being born and that this world is constantly
renewed through birth."" However revolutionary, however novel, however
progressive be the times into which a child is born, the world is old. It is
11
"superannuated
and close to destruction:' 123 And this fact of natality is what gives
education its special mandate, its political essence:
Education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world
enough to assume responsibility for it and by the same token save it from
that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the new and
young, would be inevitable. And education, too, is where we decide whether
we love our children enough not to expel them from our world and leave
them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands the chance of
undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare
them in advance for the task of renewing a common world.24
There is much in this rich quotation that gestures toward what is at stake in
approaches to, and debates about, education.
First, Arendt emphasizes here that education is about the sustenance and
continuance of social worlds. Education is where culture happens, it is where
the old, otherwise consigned to fade, is refreshed and restored by new hands.
Community is confirmed, renewed, and sustained through the faithful representation of the world to the "new ones:' And so Arendt speaks of the way in which
parents, through education, assume responsibility.25"for the life and development
of the child and for the continuance of the world. Because we love our worlds,
through education we entrust their continuance and vitality to a new generation.
But Arendt's claim is ultimately one about political freedom, not just the
transmission of culture and the continuance of social worlds. Were it only that,
education could be solely a familial, private, or parochial matter. To be sure, Arendt
sees the family as serving a potentially important role, a role that she links to the
need that children have for privacy. She describes the family as the four walls that
protect the child from the outside world: "These four walls, within which people's
private family life is lived, constitute a shield against the world and specifically
against the public aspect of the world:',26 But the family is not the site of the respon
sibility that she has in mind. As much as the family can be a site of shelter, it can
also be a place of unfreedom, repression, and-too often-denial of the dignity of
a safe and full existence. As Arendt herself notes, the responsibility assumed by
parents for the continuance of their world can work at cross-purposes with their
responsibility for the life and development of the child. The four walls are as apt to
constrain as to protect. And it is here that we see Arendt's dominant theme
emerge-education as a condition for freedom:
22
23
24
25
26

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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189.
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182 (italics added).
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108 Benjamin L. Berger
Normally the child is first introduced to the world in school. Now school
is by no means the world and must not pretend to be; it is rather the institution that we interpose between the private domain of home and the world
in order to make the transition from the family to the world possible at all.
Attendance there is required not by the family but by the state, that is by the
public world, and so, in relation to the child, school in a sense represents the
world, although it is not yet actually the world. 2
Education is the bridge between family or community and "the world.' It seeks
to equip children with a picture of the world as they will find it. In so doing,
education opens up new alternatives in their horizons of possibility for their lives,
for ethical engagement with others, and for forms of a common world. Education
gives children "the chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen
by us."28 Because we love our children, through education we equip them for
freedom.
Education is about making and sustaining community, about shaping a
creative, ethical actor in the world; it is perhaps one of the key pivot points between
family and society; it is a site for preparation for the world as we now find it; and,
in complex ways, it is a place for the cultivation and exercise of freedom.
This is what sits at the heart of conflicts and debates about religious diversity,
the state, and education. These contests that take place within school settings are
conversations about the world for which we are prepared to take responsibility.
For religious groups and the state alike, education is the means by which culture,
tradition, value, and community are affirmed and sustained. Education is a political
act concerned with inducing a child into a social world; in this, it is unapologetically conservative. This is, indeed, the appeal and importance of education to the
state and to subnational (including religious) communities alike. It is this reality
that led to the provision for religious schools as the key protection for French
culture at the founding of Canada. This is one facet of education-the transmission of social worlds. Yet, as Arendt stresses, education is also about providing
the conditions for the ethical exercise of freedom, with all the possibilities and
uncertainties-the potential for the truly new-that this entails. This is the complex
frame in which cases about religion and education must be read.

SL v Commission scolaire des Chines
It is with these ideas in mind that I now examine a case decided
29 in 2012 by the
Supreme Court of Canada, SL v Commission scolairedes Chenes. The case raised
the question of whether parents may exempt their children from classes designed
to expose them to a variety of religious traditions and to the history of religion in
Quebec. The decision discloses much about recent shifts in the terrain of religion
and secularism in Canada, and it does so in a context that interestingly activates
the concerns and stakes that I have thus far explored.

27

28
29

Ibid. at 185.
Ibid. at 193. See Mordechai Gordon, "Hannah Arendt on Authority: Conservatism in Education
Reconsidered;' EducationalTheory 49, no. 2 (1999): 161 at 172.
SL v Commission scolairedes Chenes, [2012] 1 SCR 235.
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To appreciate the case fully, the SL decision must be placed on two interesting
trajectories in the interaction of law and religion in Canada. The first is a shift in
the types of concerns reflected in law and religion cases. One might say that early
in the jurisprudence under the Charter,the dominant theme in the religious
freedom cases at the Supreme Court of Canada was the disembedding of Christian
privilege. The first freedom of religion case heard by the Supreme Court under the
Charter,and the case that set the path for the development of the jurisprudence in
this area, was R v Big M Drug Mart. The case turned on whether the common
Sunday day of rest, imposed under legislation entitled The Lord's Day Act, was
consistent with principles of religious liberty. In finding that the legislation was
irredeemably tainted by its facial endorsement of religion, contrary to the right to
be freefrom state-imposed religion, Justice Dickson (as he then was) explained the
mischief of the legislation as follows:
To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian Christian ideal, the Lord's Day Act
works a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charterand the dignity
of all non-Christians .... The theological content of the legislation remains as
a subtle and constant reminder to religious minorities within the country of
31
their differences with, and alienation from, the dominant religious culture.
Thus, the early tone of the jurisprudence under the Charterwas one that sounded
in the register of the pluralistic demands of a secular society. This and other early
decisions were frequently about unseating Christianity's privileged place next to
state institutions and in political life. This tone was also present in the field of
education, with early cases famously concerning themselves with stripping away the
artefacts of Christian historical privilege in public schools. In Zylberbergv Sudbury
Board of Education,B2 the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled unconstitutional a local
regulation that required that public school days begin or end with the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer, a practice that had subsisted in many Canadian public schools
since early in the life of the country. Drawing inspiration from Justice Dickson's
reasons in Big M, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that this practice served to
inculcate Christianity among public school pupils and was inconsistent with the
multicultural reality of modern Canada. Provisions allowing for children to be
exempted from the practice could not cure the problem. This 1988 decision sits
interestingly alongside similar issues that have emerged more recently in Turkey,
France, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe.
The examples could be multiplied. The key point is that in many of the early
cases, freedom of religion was really about evenhandedness among religious and
non-religious creeds, freedom from state-enforced religious practices or norms,
and, in particular, disrupting the structural hegemony of Christianity. Over the
next twenty years, the varieties of cases on religion pluralized, but the jurisprudence on freedom of religion remained comparatively underdeveloped within the
package of Charterrights. The interesting inversion reflected in the SL decision
occurred during a renaissance in the law of religious freedom in the last ten years.
30
31
32

RvBigMDrugMart,[1985] 1SCR 295.
Ibid. at 337.
Supra note 16.
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On one interpretation of the recent cases, issues of religious freedom have ceased
to be primarily about freedom from religion;33 instead, they have come to be about
religious groups seeking exemptions from, or to push back on, a secular or nonreligious default environment. Many of these cases have been about the appearance
of religious symbols in public spaces.3 4 Such cases have also penetrated the education
setting, with an important decision in recent Canadian jurisprudence on religious
accommodation concerning the ability of a Sikh youngster to wear a kirpan, or
religious dagger, in public school. 35 Most relevant to this article is a meaningful
subset of these cases in which religious schools, or religious individuals involved in
public schools, have sought to resist substantive curricular or normative principles
using arguments based in religious freedom.
One such case is Hall v Powers,36 in which a Roman Catholic school refused to
allow a gay student to bring his boyfriend to the high school prom. The student
sought an interim injunction that would force the school to permit him and his
boyfriend to attend. Despite the fact that this was a Roman Catholic school, the
Court was sympathetic and issued the injunction. In the same year, the Supreme
Court of Canada considered the case of Chamberlain v Surrey School DistrictNo
36.37 Although not squarely a Chartercase, Chamberlainwas an important point in
the recent Canadian jurisprudence on religion and secularism. The case involved a
local public school board that, on the basis of the religious views of the parents in the
constituency, had prohibited the use of resources depicting same-sex parented families in kindergarten and grade 1 classes. The Supreme Court referred to the secular
nature of public schools, as explicitly mandated by the governing legislation, and
held that the decision of the school board was unreasonable because it had failed to
give weight to secular principles of anti-discrimination, equality, and diversity. One
further example, though one in which the religious community was successful in
pushing back on secular norms, is Trinity Western University v British Columbia
College of Teachers.3 8 The case involved a college of teachers that had denied public
accreditation to the teacher program of an Evangelical Christian university on the
grounds that the University required agreement to a code of conduct that discriminated against homosexual students and faculty. Trinity Western University (TWU)
successfully challenged the College's decision. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled
that it was improper for the College to predict the future conduct of teachers trained
at TWU on the basis of the code of conduct that they had signed.
Recent cases invert the earlier problematic. Less concerned with using the law
to cleanse schools of religious traces, litigants now deploy the logic of freedom of

36
37
38
38

With its unique history of state church relations, reflected in the historical sketch provided earlier
in this article, Canada has never adopted the strict institutional separationism found in US
constitutional law, nor has it endorsed the laic approach found in France. Nevertheless, early in
the Charterjurisprudence, Canadian courts recognized that freedom of religion implies freedom
from religion, in the sense of freedom from coercion or compulsion in matters of religion.
See, e.g., Rosenberg v Outremont (City), [2001] RJQ 1556 (SC), concerning the eruv, or Syndicat
Northcrest v Amselem [2004] 2 SCR 551, concerning the sukkah on a balcony.
See Multani v Commission scolaireMargueriteBourgeoys, [2006] 1 SCR 256.
Supra note 18.
Supra note 17.
Supra note 19.
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religion to resist a felt hegemony of secular ideals. In a subtle shift, freedom from
religion becomes freedom from the secular. SL sits at the high-water mark of this
fascinating inversion, which is the first frame of context for the case.
The second arc of historical development in which the SL decision participates again, at a kind of zenith of the trend-is more particular to the distinctive religious and social history of Quebec. In the latter half of the twentieth century,
Canada experienced a profound diversification of cultures within its populace.
This increased pluralism eventually led to a Canadian approach of multiculturalism
and, in 1971, the adoption of multiculturalism as official state policy. The period
also saw increasing support for human rights instruments, culminating in the
entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While all of
Canada was affected by these trends, Quebec underwent another profound change.
Of course, historically, Quebec's autonomy and identity were closely tied to
Catholicism and the church. During the 1960s, a set of rapid and intense social
changes in Quebec-the so-called Quiet Revolution-transformed the society.
Although there were other social and political changes associated with the Quiet
Revolution, of most relevance to this article was the radical erosion of the power
of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec and the dramatic decoupling of secular
politics and religious authority. Just as it had been crucial to the constitutional
history of Catholicism in Canada, education was also central to the shifts of the
Quiet Revolution. In 1964, the Quebec government took control of public education,
which had been overseen largely by Catholic organizations before that time. This
began a process that would culminate, three decades later, in the end of denominational school boards in Quebec and the removal of Quebec from the education
provisions of section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The SL case was a response to the most recent move in this fifty-year process
of disentanglement of religion and education in Quebec. In 2005, the Quebec
government elected to replace all remaining Catholic and Protestant programs of
religious instruction with the Ethics and Religious Culture Course (ERC), a compulsory common education program for all public schools. Schools were no longer
denominational by this time, but students still frequently received some form of
religious instruction within their public educations. The ERC would end such
instruction, replacing it with a program that would teach students about varieties
of ethical and cultural frameworks within Quebec, and would instruct them in a
range of religious traditions and in the history of religion in Quebec. The preamble
to the program, as it relates to religion, states:
Instruction in religious culture, for its part, is aimed at fostering an understanding of several religious traditions whose influence has been felt and
is still felt in our society today. In this regard, emphasis will be placed on
Quebec's religious heritage. The historical and cultural importance of
Catholicism and Protestantism will be given particular prominence. The
goal is neither to accompany students in a spiritual quest, nor to present
the history of doctrines and religions, nor to promote
39 some new common
religious doctrine aimed at replacing specific beliefs.
39

SL, supra note 29 at para 34.

112 Benjamin L. Berger
The purpose of the course was to prepare children for life in a pluralistic society, to
educate them in the range of religious traditions that they might encounter, and to
teach them about the religious heritage of Quebec. In 1997, when the first steps
towards this new curriculum were being taken, Quebec's Minister of Education
justified the move in the following way:
The social and religious landscape is shifting in all regions of Quebec.
Public schools must respect the free choice or the free refusal of religion....
All schools must teach students to respect different allegiances. However,
our schools must not altogether dismiss religious education. They must
show that they are open and able to recognize, regardless of specific convictions and from a critical point of view, the contribution made by the
different religions in terms of culture, values and humanism....
... in the context of a pluralistic society, is it not desirable that all students
receive some instruction concerning the phenomenon of religion, courses
on religious culture which
cover the various great traditions, and courses on
40
the history of religion?

In 2008, the ERC became mandatory for all students in Quebec.
In May of that year, S. L. and D. J., Roman Catholic parents of two school-aged
children in Quebec, requested an exemption from the ERC for their children
on the basis that the program infringed on their and their children's freedom of
conscience and religion. The heart of their position was that the ERC interfered
with their ability to pass on Roman Catholicism to their children because it
purported to teach about Catholicism in a neutral way alongside a number of
other religions. Such an approach, the parents claimed, would inculcate a kind of
relativism, whereas they sought to instil in their children a commitment to the
truth of the Catholic creed. Educational authorities twice rejected the parents'
request for an exemption, decisions that were confirmed by the Superior Court
and the Court of Appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the central
question was whether mandatory
exposure to the ERC in public schools infringed
41
on religious freedom.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The crux of its decision was that the
applicant parents had failed to discharge their burden of showing precisely how
the ERC would interfere with their sincerely held commitment (and right) to pass
on their religion to their children. It is important to observe-and the majority and
the separate concurring decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada emphasizethat because the case was initiated so shortly after the ERC went into effect, no
evidence was available as to how the course was actually delivered in public
schools. Both the majority and minority decisions suggest that if the ERC were
ultimately implemented in a way that was disparaging or dismissive of religion, the

40
41

Ibid. at paras 13 and 14.
The case of Quebec (Procureurgeneral) c Loyola High School, 2012 QCCA 2139, raises an
associated and potentially even more fraught issue whether private religious schools must teach
the ERC as prescribed by the ministry, or whether they can deliver a faith inflected version of the
course. At the time of publication, an appeal of this decision was scheduled to be heard by the
Supreme Court of Canada.

Religious Diversity, Education, and Neutrality 113
issue might well look different. But so long as such instruction does not denigrate
or promote one or another conception of religion, the mere fact of instructing
children on various religious, ethical, and cultural systems, as well as on religious
history in Quebec, does not interfere with parents' religious freedom. For the
Court, the magic lies in the concept of "indoctrination" which is the legal limit on
the state's capacity to instruct on religion. The Court rejects the proposition that
"exposing children to 'a comprehensive presentation of various religions without
forcing the children to join them' constitutes in itself an indoctrination of students
142

that would infringe the appellants' freedom of religion:' Parents could continue
to instruct their children on Catholicism as they saw fit at home.
The parents further argued that instruction on a variety of religious traditions
without any clear position being transmitted- and, presumably, in dissonance
with what is being taught at home-produces confusion in the child. The Court's
reasoning in rejecting this argument is revealing in light of the themes of this
article. Justice Deschamps writes as follows:
Parents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their children if they so
wish. However, the early exposure of children to realities that differ from
those in their immediate family environment is a fact of life in society. The
suggestion that exposing children to a variety of religious facts in itself
infringes their religious freedom or that of their parents amounts to a
rejection of the multicultural reality of Canadian society and ignores the
Quebec government's obligations with regard to public education. Although
such exposure can be a source of friction, it does not in itself constitute an
infringement
of s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charterand of s. 3 of the Quebec
43
Charter.
The Court expresses confidence in children's capacity to hold together multiple
messages in the mix of education that they receive from their parents and from the
school. But Justice Deschamps goes further. She suggests that the state might have
a duty to expose children to a variety of religious and cultural "facts" around them,
reasoning that the "multicultural reality of Canada" imposes certain obligations on
the state regarding education. So long as the message remains "neutral" (a matter
to which I will return below), to deny the Quebec government the ability to teach
such a course to all children would be to disregard this obligation.
The decision is not terribly consequential as a matter of legal doctrine, turning
as it did on an evidentiary point: given the early stage of the implementation of the
ERC, the applicants were not able to adduce evidence that the course was being
taught in a way that interfered with their ability to educate their children in a
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manner consistent with Roman Catholicism. Should such evidence emerge, the case
might resolve differently. A general education in a range of religious traditions and
in the social and political history of religion did not, in itself, amount to secular
indoctrination, as the parents suggested. The case nevertheless offers much for
understanding why the field of education is such a persistent flashpoint around the
world for issues of religion and secularism.
The Court's use of the concept of indoctrination is where I want to join this
decision with the broader ideas and themes evoked in the discussion of Arendt's
views on education. Specifically, I want to question and qualify the Court's claim
that the course is not a form of indoctrination. All education is, in a sense, a project
of indoctrination. Education is a means of inducing a child into a world. It is about
culture and, to exploit the etymology of the term, the cultivation of a certain kind of
subject. Education is an opportunity for the transmission of tradition and history,
and for the necessary preparation of children for the task of renewing and
sustaining community. This was Arendt's first insight. 44 It goes some distance in
helping to appreciate the stakes of such disputes, and to understand the passion and
persistence of questions of education in the meeting of religion and state authority.
The history of confederation, the experience of Aboriginal peoples, and
the activism of Jewish and other religious communities around issues of education45
in Canada all point to the depth of communities' interest in education. In Adler,
a case in which non-Catholic parents argued that the funding of Catholic and
public schools, in accordance with section 93 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, but not
other religious schools, breached their equality and religious freedom rights,
Justice IiHeureux-Dub6 supported her dissenting position that the state should be
required to provide funding to these groups in the following terms:
At issue here are the efforts of small, insular religious minority communities seeking to survive in a large, secular society... we cannot imagine a
deeper scar being inflicted on a more insular group by the denial of a more
fundamental interest; it is the very survival of these communities which is
threatened.46
It is for this reason that governments have continued to learn, as the example
of the Doukhobors taught in Canada, that cultural communities will strugglepolitically and, if necessary, physically-over issues of education. What is at stake
in education is the future and vitality of the group itself, the continuation of a
social world.
The more difficult question from a liberal political position is whether the state
has a legitimate claim to the formation of its citizens. May it use education as a
means of shaping children, of inducing them into the world as we have it? Viewed
from some perspectives, this kind of self-conscious citizen formation on the part
of the state may seem to have a certain illiberal quality to it; to be sure, to allow the
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state to occupy all corners of the landscape of education-public and private-and
to crowd out community, family, and religious interests in the formation of the
child would be both unwise and repressive. Yet with deep pluralism and secularism
(understood in some fashion) 47 as important political facts about our world, a
central role for the state in citizen formation seems to be an irreducible public
function. A pluralist democracy depends on the capacity of citizens to engage in
thoughtful and inclusive forms of deliberation amidst, and enriched by, substantial divergence in lifestyles and worldviews. As Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure
emphasize, "Peaceful coexistence in a diverse society requires that we learn to find
normal a range of identity-related differences:' 4 8 Intercultural knowledge, habits
of tolerance, and respectful interaction across difference now appear to be civic
skills comparable in importance to basic knowledge in math and science. 49 In
equipping children with these skills through primary and secondary education,
the state is preparing them to discharge the burdens of responsible participation in
a pluralist democracy, one in which they will have the opportunity to interact,
collaborate, and constructively disagree with those who hold beliefs and live
modes of life that differ from and challenge their own. Moreover, education
about difference serves the principle of respect for autonomy, a commitment that
underwrites fundamental rights and freedoms and on which the functioning of
our democratic institutions depends. Such exposure to diversity is an expression
of regard for, and an aspect of the cultivation of, the developing autonomy of
children. As Colin Macleod explains, the "development of the contemplative
aspect of autonomy involves ensuring that children learn about, understand, and
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even have a kind of appreciation of the plurality of ends and perspectives that are
present in a diverse society. 50
This kind of education may well "make the task more difficult for parents
seeking to transmit a particular order of beliefs to their children and even more
difficult for groups wishing to shield themselves from the influence of the larger
society; 51 it is nevertheless essential to cultivating the child's own capacity for
critical and sensitive engagement with local, national, and global issues. 52 Indeed,
in its majority decision in Chamberlain v Surrey School DistrictNo 36,5 the Court
affirmed the legitimacy of such a role for public education. While recognizing the
strong interest that parents have in their children's education, and the importance
of parental involvement, Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized that "[p]arental
views, however important, cannot override the imperative placed upon the British
Columbia public schools to mirror the diversity of the community and teach
tolerance and understanding of difference.' 5 4 "Schools," the Court held in TWU,
are meant to develop civic virtue and responsible citizenship. 55 Recall Arendt's
claim that school serves the important role of introducing the child to the world,
that it "represents the world' and that it is "the institution that we interpose
between the private domain of home and the world in order to make the transition
56
from the family to the world possible at all:' When that world is, factually, one of
competing claims of truth, of religious diversity, sexual diversity, and rich cultural
difference, there is a strong case to be made that the state has a responsibility to
equip the child for the transition between community or family and the broader
57
world, for the sake of that common world that they are all tasked with renewing.
In the words of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, education should
be
58
directed to "the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society.
One might object that to call this kind of state undertaking "indoctrination" is
to misuse the term: a key feature of indoctrination, properly identified, is the
intent to contain and limit options and alternatives contemplated by the subject.
State education in Canada, as I have described it, is not engaged in that kind
of horizon-limiting project. This refinement is welcome because it specifies a
condition of any claim that the state has to citizen formation. Such a claim by the
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state is justified owing to education's function in opening up horizons of possibility for the child, nourishing the individual's capacity for critical reflection, and
serving as an open, traversable portal between world and family. The political
activity of education is justifiable to the extent that it plays the role that Arendt
imagines (her second, crucial, point)-that it conduces to the child's freedom.
Important limitations on and caveats in the state's use of education in citizen
formation flow from that principle: First, such education must proceed with
respect and appreciation for the traditions, ways, and beliefs found at home or
in communities. Family and religious community can be rich sources of nourishment and meaning; they are often-though not always-the raw material for
children's self-definition and the exercise of their autonomy. 59 Nothing about
enlarging awareness of difference, cultivating skills of responsible citizenship,
and facilitating a child's free authorship of their lives commands or justifies
estrangement from these substantial resources. Second, to endorse one religion or
to disparage S•a non-harmful
religious practice or tradition is inconsistent with
60
these objectives. The purpose of such education is not to take positions on or to
impose a "particular conception of the good life:' 61 Insistence on this posture-let
us call it a posture of neutrality-is crucial, as is recognition of the legitimate claim
that states share with parents and communities to the formation of the child.
Some will immediately object that the priority given to freedom, selfauthorship, and respect for difference, as well as the challenges that such education
may pose for some parents and communities, is inconsistent with any such claim
of neutrality. With this, consideration of SL and the stakes of education brings us
to a significant conceptual point about what it is that we ask of the state in the
management of religious diversity, the point on which I wish to conclude this article.
The Idea of State Neutrality
A notable feature of the Supreme Court's decision in SL is the centrality of "state
neutrality" as the governing principle for analyzing problems of religious diversity.
Both Justice Deschamps's majority decision and the separate concurring decision,
written by Justice LeBel, cite neutrality as the conceptual touchstone for the
modern secular state. Justice Deschamps explains that "[tjhe concept of state
religious neutrality in Canadian case law has developed alongside a growing sen62
sitivity to the multicultural makeup of Canada and the protection of minorities,"
and Justice LeBel specifically notes that the Supreme Court has consistently
11
"stressed the importance
of neutrality in the public school system '163 Apart from
59 See Macleod, "Toleration, Children and Education;' supra note 13 at 16.
60 Reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 58, is instructive here.
Article 29 states that education is to be directed toward the child's self fulfillment; respect for human
rights, tolerance, equality, and the environment; and generally to "preparation of the child for
responsible life in a free society" (section 1(a, b, d, e)). Yet section 1(c) also affirms a commitment
to "the development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language
and values" alongside "the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country
from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own?'
62 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, supra note 48 at 103.
63 SL, supra note 29 at para 21.
Ibid. at para 54.
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the evidentiary ruling that leads the Court to dismiss the claim, the preoccupation
of the Court in SL is the affirmation of a commitment to a legal standard of state
neutrality in response to the parents' contention that the ERC was not a neutral
curricular offering. At one fascinating point in the judgment, Justice Deschamps
grants that perfect state neutrality might not be possible from a philosophical
standpoint. In so doing, she opens space for what I think must be conceded-that
a course such as the ERC may not be received by religious parents or communities
as an entirely neutral phenomenon. 64 But with a quick "be that as it may," the
Court backs away from this finer philosophical point, taking comfort in the notion
of state neutrality as a workable legal construct and rehearsing the legal genealogy
of state neutrality in Canada. In effect, the Court's response is to affirm that the
case is about state neutrality, to endorse that concept and its centrality, and to
simply deny that a breach of this controlling principle has occurred.
The place given by the Supreme Court of Canada in SL to state neutrality as the
organizing principle in matters of religious diversity reflects something interesting
about the history of ideas regarding the intersection of religion and the state.
Toleration, so crucial to early political thought about religious difference, retains
an important role in contemporary political and legal discussion about religion,
signalling a need for an ethic of respect and practices of accommodation in matters
of religious difference. 65 Nevertheless, one can discern a shift in emphasis, from language of "toleration" to that of "neutrality." Judged on the basis of recent court rulings
from a variety of courts around the world, one might well conclude that the concept
of state neutrality has succeeded toleration as the guiding virtue in the legal treatment
of religious difference. 66 As the Supreme Court of Canada itself notes, "[R] eligious
neutrality is now seen by many Western states as a [the?] legitimate means of creating
a free space in which citizens of various beliefs can exercise their individual rights.
The concepts of toleration and neutrality are frequently invoked together,
but in fact, they paint quite different pictures of the dynamics involved in law's
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response to religious difference. While calling for a certain ethic of respect
and commitment to pluralism, toleration nevertheless conserves and confirms
68
relations of power in its structural assumption of a "tolerator" and a "tolerated:'
A tolerating "us" and a tolerated "them" is implicit in the idea of toleration as a
response to difference. Legal toleration closely aligns that "us" with the authority and
power of the state. Furthermore, the invocation of toleration also always conjures up
its limits. Toleration is a kind of ad hoc response to difference-thus, I might be
moved or required to tolerate one point of disagreement or difference but find another
intolerable. The limits of legal
tend to faithfully trace the cultural assump•
•toleration
•69
tions that ground liberal constitutional culture. Finally, and most notable in its contrast with neutrality, toleration concedes-indeed, it proceeds from-the existence of
a normative position on the side of the tolerator. Otherwise put, when applied in
response to religious difference, legal toleration admits that the legal system embodies
and expresses a set of commitments and judgments about a good life-concedes
its non-neutrality-butcounsels acceptance of certain departures from the norm
in the name of political peace, mutual respect, or other strategic or moral ends.
Viewed in that light, it ought not to be surprising that neutrality has become so
attractive in modern legal secularism. In a society of comparative religious homogeneity and unabashed confessional
partiality-the kind of conditions out of
70
which the concept emerged 0_toleration may have been a relatively satisfying
response. In a modern context of deep normative pluralism, however, the politics and
partiality implicit in toleration can prove troublesome. Neutrality seems to offer more.
A principle of state neutrality speaks to the evenhandedness necessary in a religiously
and culturally plural society. Furthermore, in Canada as elsewhere, the concept of state
neutrality appealingly maps political instincts that focus on equality as the nonpareil
political virtue (although there is a risk that embracing an unsophisticated conception
of neutrality can unseat the idea that substantive equality sometimes demands
practices of differential treatment and recognition). But most importantly, use of the
concept of state neutrality better effaces the power dynamics involved in the management of religious diversity. It rhetorically positions law outside the "us" and "them"
of political conflict; it casts law in the role of disinterested conciliator rather than
boundary-setter; and its invocation relieves the legal system of the burden of its own
cultural and historical contingency. With this, the language of neutrality appeals to
a powerful myth that underwrites contemporary law. The conceit of autonomy
upon which modern liberal legal orders lean for their political authority works by
depoliticizing law's rule sufficiently to attract broad assent. 7 1 Jean Comaroff and
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John L. Comaroff perceptively describe the seductiveness of law's neutrality amid
the complexities of modern political life:
[T]he language of legality offers an ostensibly note, ostensibly neutral
register for communication across lines of social and cultural cleavage,
making it possible to equate unlike values, to authorize hybrid collaborations, and to adjudicate impossibly contradictory claims. The pragmatic
promise ofjural instruments is that they have the capacity to create equivalence amidst contrast, providing a currency that appears to allow for the
transaction of incommensurable interests across otherwise intransitive
borders. Thus it is that law offers a common denominator, and a means of
imposing coherence, in socially and ethically incoherent circumstances. 72
The same process of depoliticization and desire for coherence helps to explain the
attractiveness of an organizing principle of state neutrality when attention is
turned to problems of religious diversity. Consider, for example, the following
passage from Justice Deschamps's dissenting opinion in Bruker v Marcovitz, a
passage in which the very essence of Canadas commitment to religious freedom
and multiculturalism turns out to be a guarantee of neutrality, a guarantee that
underwrites the legitimacy of law under conditions of religious diversity:
Canada's adoption of multiculturalism and attachment to the fundamental
values of freedom of conscience and religion and of the right to equality
guarantee to all Canadians that the courts will remain neutral where religious
precepts are concerned. This neutrality gives the courts the legitimacy they
need to play their role as arbiters in relation to the cohabitation of different
73
religions and enables them to decide how to reconcile conflicting rights.
This is a fine expression of the typical imaginative tethering of law's legitimacy
to the depoliticizing effects of the concept of neutrality. Neutrality is a more
comforting, less politicized banner under which to march in a landscape of
considerable normative difference.
Whatever the reason for the concept's ascendance, its current appeal and
influence seems uncontroversial. And, to be sure, substantial political good can be
achieved through a commitment to state neutrality and evenhandedness in the
treatment of religion. A demand for neutrality imposes a welcome discipline on
government to carefully consider the ways in which its actions may unjustifiably
favour one religion or impose burdens on another. It also counsels caution in
installing any particular metaphysical views-including agnosticism or atheismas a de facto state religion. But a case like SL suggests a risk of slippage or concept
creep in the use of this orienting idea. In the hands of some, the requirement
for neutrality can expand to suggest that any position-taking on the part of the
state, any pursuit of a vision of a good society, is a mischief Issues of religion and
education, viewed and understood in the frame in which I have presented them,
point to a distinction worthy of identification and commanding attention within
the concept of state neutrality.
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The crucial conceptual distinction is this: the state must be neutral in its
treatment of religion; it need not, however, be neutral about the nature of a good
society. 74 Though its demand for evenhandedness in the state treatment of various
religions-as well as non-religion-is noble and sound, what state neutrality
should not be heard to demand is the state's indifference to the conditions necessary
for a healthy civic life. Maclure and Taylor share this conception of what state
neutrality demands, expressing the point in terms of "constitutive values":
A liberal and democratic state cannot remain indifferent to certain core
principles, such as human dignity, basic human rights, and popular sovereignty. These are the constitutive values of liberal and democratic political
systems; they provide these systems with their foundations and aims.
Although equality of state treatment in matters of religion must be assiduously
pursued, the demand for state neutrality should not expand to require the state to
resile from the pursuit of the conditions necessary for a just and ethical common
world. To concede more to the concept of state neutrality invites an unreflective
libertarianism, confusing the neutral state with an inert state, one not permitted
to act in the interests of the political community. State action that defends
and promotes the principles and aims of a democracy characterized by freedom,
equality, and respect for difference does not thereby offend the principle of state
neutrality in matters of religion.
Of course, it matters deeply how the state pursues such principles and aims. If
inclusion and respect for diversity are democratic lodestars, any state actionincluding the design of state education- should itself be characterized by openness to multiple voices, various perspectives, and critical debate. One should
expect modesty from state institutions, recognizing that family, community,
and culture can be important sources of insight and meaning for individuals and
ethical resources for society as a whole. That is, indeed, one of the strengths of
a pluralist democracy. And one would be right to demand due appreciation for
the depth of the claims involved in matters of religious difference, regard for the
complex ways that cultural communities are constituted, and attention to the
needs of such communities. But so long as those features are in place, the concept
of state neutrality is not incommensurable with a principled defence of the needs
and conditions of a just political community. Courts play an important role in
insisting on those features and ensuring an evenhanded treatment of religion.
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Yet, freed from the burden of a too-capacious conception of state neutrality, they
can also play a crucial role in clearly articulating, for continued assessment and
debate, the principles and demands of a pluralist democracy.
The "crisis" with which Arendt was so concerned was a crisis of responsibility.
Faced with the many intense interests that constellate around education in the
context of a religiously diverse society, the invocation of the idea of neutrality
cannot relieve us of the burdens of this responsibility. Neutrality in education
cannot suggest that the state must stand inactive when conscious of the need to
ensure the continuance of a common social world, and mindful of the interests of
children, whose autonomy and identity cannot be neatly folded into that of their
parents. State neutrality in matters of religion does not compel a society agnostic
about its own value, health, and needs, or about the freedom of the children who
will be charged with sustaining it.
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